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ABSTRACT

The Change in Systematic Risk after the 9/11 Events:
An Analysis of Restaurant Industry

by
Kihim Kim
Dr. Zheng Gu, Examination Committee Chair
Professor o f Hotel Administration
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
The tragic events o f September 11,2001 (the 9/11 events) have had a dramatic
impact on all aspects o f American society. Although all facets o f U. S. society have been
aGected by the September 11 attacks, it is hard to identify an industry that felt those
efkcts more immediately than the hospitality industry. The aftermath o f the events of
9/11 has forced the hospitality industry to face a disastrous fact in terms of decreased
customer demand. The purpose o f this study was to investigate whether the average
systematic risk, or beta, o f the restaurant industry changed signihcantly after 9/11. More
specihcally, this study examined the dif&rence in systematic risk o f diGerent types of
restaurants, such as Gne/casual dining restaurants, family restaurants, and fast food
restaurants in the pre-9/11 and post-9/11 period. The Endings indicate that the systematic
risk has not changed signiGcantly both for the restaurant industry and for each restaurant
segment that was examined.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
In the United States, the tragic events of September 11,2001 (9/11) have had a
dramatic impact on all aspects o f American society. According to Emst and Young
(2001) the immediate efkct o f the disaster was to accelerate the contracEon o f the U.S.
economy, which was already languishing in the months before the events o f 9/11. Soon
after the events o f 9/11, forecasters projected a slowdown in Gross DomesEc Product
(GDP) of 1.4 percent or more in the third quarter o f2001, slashing growth to minus 0.9
percent and moving the economy gradually into a recession. The U.S. NaEonal Income
and Product Accounts (2003) estimated the losses to property hom the 9/11 events at
approximately $16 billion, just over 0.15 percent o f the annual GDP.
Although all facets ofU .S. society have been afkcted by the events o f 9/11, it is
hard to cite an industry that has felt those eGects more immediately than the hospitality
industry (O 'N eill & Lloyd-Jones, 2001). Since the 9/11 events, there have been many
arEcles about its effects on various industries. The hospitality industry is no excepEon to
the scrutiny o f the impact o f 9/11. The aftermath o f 9/11 has forced the hospitality
industry to face some hard facts in terms o f decreased customer demand. Queiroz (2002)
suggested that hospitality companies have been challenged with reducEons in corporate
travel, canceled convenEons, employee layoffs, declining consumer conEdence,
corporate reorganizaEons, and insurance coverage volaElity. According to the Fiscal
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Policy InsEtute (2001), Eie New York City economy was expected to lose an estimated
108,500 jobs within the Erst month fbUowing the 9/11 as a direct result of the attack on
the World Trade Center. This is ^proximately 2.4 percent o f total local employment
including full-Eme, part-time, and the self-employed. The greatest impact on New York
City jobs as a result o f the 9/11 events has been on the three industries of securiEes, retail
trade, and restaurants. Numerous restaurants were destroyed, E)rced to close, or cut staff
due to the spillover eGects on tourism and business travel.
The 9/11 attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C., combined with the
already weak domesEc economy, had an adverse impact on the U.S. restaurant industry.
According to the Bureau o f Labor StaEsEcs (2002), the restaurant industry lost
qiproximately 103,000 jobs, nearly double the historical rate, due to slower sales because
o f the economic condiEons resulting Eom the September 11 terrorist attacks (Nolt &
Kim, 2001). According to several restaurant execuEves at the 2002 mulE-unit
Foodservice Operators Conference held in Orlando, Flonda, fallout Enm the 9/11 events
has leA fbodservice operators in airport venues facing skyrocketing insurance rates and
other operators investing substanEal resources to protect against future terrorist threats
(Peters, 2002).
Hawawini and Viallet (1999) illustrated (Fig. 1) the transmission of risk Eom
sales to proEts. Hawawini and Viallet also provided the relaEonship between earnings
aAer taxes (EAT) and earnings before interest and taxes (EB IT) and descnbed the risk of
this relaEonship a s n s L

They also explained the relaEonship between EBIT and

sales and descnbed the risk o f this relaEonship as operaEowz/ nÆ They further speciEed
that sales Euctuated because o f the uncertain economic, poliEcal, social, and compeEEve
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environment in which Grms operated. They characterized this risk, faced by all firms, as
ecoMo/Mfc

Hawawini and Viallet interpreted the cumulative effect o f economic risk

and operational risk as
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Adapted &om Hawawini and Viallet (1999)

Figure 1 Oraphical representation o f economic, operational, and Gnancial risk

Hamada (1972) and Rubenstein (1973) demonstrated that operating risk and
financial risk were the fundamental components o f systematic risk. Strong (2001)
extended their studies by suggesting that both operational risk and Gnancial risk migiht be
empirically represented through the respective use o f the degree o f operating leverage
(DOL) and the degree o f financial leverage (DFL). GrifBn (2001) also expanded on their
research by separating economic risk Gom business risk and presented empirically the
economic risk construct through the use of the degree o f economic leverage (DEL).
GrifiGn proposed that the degree o f economic leverage was an incremental addition to the
explanation o f systematic risk in the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).
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Systematic risk is deGned as the asset's return covariance with the market
portfbho o f nsky assets. The speciGc measure o f systematic risk used in the CAPM is
called the asset's beta (P). Beta is Airther deGned as the covariance between the asset
returns and market returns divided by the variance o f the market returns. Because the
Grm's returns are aGected by Grm sales, and variance o f sales is attributed to GuctuaGons
in the economy that result Gom uncertainGes in the economic, poliGcal, social, and
compeGGve environment, this thesis presents the concept that external enviromnental
changes have an impact on the Gmdamental change in systemaGc nsk o f the restaurant
industry. GrifGn (2001) argued that the relaGonship between exogenous macroeconomic
factors and Grm sales has never been explicitly studied, even though it was commonly
understood that exogenous macroeconomic factors direcGy affected Grm sales. Further,
he extended the existing Mandelker and Rhee (1984) analyGcal model o f the
determinants o f systemaGc risk by examining the DEL as an explicit determinant o f beta.
In addiGon to the economic impact o f the 9/11 events on the restaurant industry,
there is also a whole level o f restaurant consumers' psychology or behavior that needs to
be understood. For example, would restaurant customers continue to want to stay at home
instead of eating out due to fears o f terronsm? According to Fbocken/zce and Hosp/to/ity
('Toodservice growth," 2001), in the weeks fbUowing the attacks, restaurant customers in
Canada did not want to go out to dinner—perhaps because they were more safety
conscious due to fears o f terrorism or perhaps because they did not feel like celebrating
birthdays or other special occasions. I f the 9/11 events had a signiGcant impact on the
restaurant industry, it may have been because restaurant customers' psychology or
behavior could have been basically changed. I f the restaurant customers' psychology or
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behavior changed due to the 9/11 events, and they did not want to keep eaGng out after
9/11 due to fear o f terrorism, this could have caused restaurant sales to plummet.
Decreased sales in the restaurant industry could affect restaurant beta, which represents
the sensidvity o f an individual stock to changes in the returns o f average market. Thus, a
change in restaurants' beta may be signiGcant due to the change in restaurant customers'
psychology or behavior aAer the 9/11 events. This study wiU address that issue.

Development o f the Restaurant Industry
The word reaiawant covers a broad range o f food service operaGons. The term
comes Gom the French word restaurant, which means "restorers o f energy." The term
was used as early as the mid-1700s to describe pubGc places that offered soup and bread.
Today, any public place that specializes in the sale o f prepared food for consumpGon on
or oGthe premises can be described as a restaurant (Powers, 1995).
According to the NaGonal Restaurant AssociaGon (NRA, 2003), the naGon's
restaurants achieved $407.8 bilGon in sales in 2002, an increase o f almost 4 percent over
2001. More than 54 billion meals were eaten in restaurants and school and work
cafeterias in 2002. According to the 2003 Restaurant Industry Forecast, the naGon's
870,000 restaurants should reach $426.1 billion in sales in 2003, which represents an
increase o f almost 4.5 percent over 2002. Thus, the growth o f the restaurant industry
during the last few years has been quite good, and the restaurant industry's beta may not
have heen signiGcanGy affected by 9/11 events.
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Purpose o f the Study
The piimary purpose o f this study was to invesGgate whether the systemaGc nsk
(|8) o f the restaurant industry was affected by 9/11 events. More speciGcally, this study
invesGgated the difference in systemaGc risk o f several types o f restaurant, such as
Gne/casual dining restaurants, family restaurants, and fast food restaurants, during the
pre- and post-9/11 periods. This study aGempts to identify the impact o f the 9/11 events
on the restaurant industry by examining the change in beta o f the restaurant industry. The
study can provide some empirical evidence on the inqiact o f market change on the change
in the restaurant business characterisGcs.

Problem Statement
Previous studies (Kim , Gu, & MattUa, 2002; Gu & Kim, 1998; Borde, 1998) have
examined the nsk features o f the hospitality industry, such as hotel real estate investment
trusts, casinos, and restaurants. Borde (1998) found that risk was signiGcanGy related to
certain Gnancial characterisGcs in the restaurant industry. SpeciGcally, the Gndings
suggest that liquidity, dividend-payout raGo, return on assets, and growth in earnings
before interest and taxes had an inGuence on systemaGc nsk. Kim et al. (2002) found that
beta was found to correlate posiGvely with Gnancial leverage and growth but negaGvely
with Grm size. Those studies, however, concentrated on Grm-wise internal factors as
determinants o f systemaGc nsk.
Other studies have found that external factors could also aGect beta. For example,
Sankaranarayanan (1986) analyzed changes in beta related to regulatory changes.
Sankaranarayanan developed a theoreGcal model that provided a relaGonship between the
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types o f regulatory changes and the direcGons of beta change: regulaGons increased beta,
and deregulaGons decreased beta. Further examinaGon showed that the observed changes
in beta could not be fuUy accounted for by the changes in Gnancial and operating
leverages o f the Grms in the aGected industry. According to Sankaranarayanan,
regulatory changes contributed signiGcantly to the explanaGon o f observed changes in
beta.
Although many arGcles have discussed the nonstaGonary characterisGc of beta
and variables that may be associated with beta nonstataionarity, the studies nevertheless
did not identify the determinants o f the beta change. GrifGn (2001) suggested that the
exogenous economic disturbance, deGned as any unforeseen event that possesses the
power to have an impact on the Grm's sales, could make a Grm's beta nonstaGonary. This
study aGempts to identify the impact of market changes on the restaurant industry by
empirically examining the change in systemaGc risk of the restaurant industry, if any, in
the wake o f the 9/11 terronst attacks. SpeciGcally, this study compares the beta far
several types o f restaurant in the periods before and after the events o f 9/11 to determine
whether characterisGcs o f each restaurant segment changed as a result o f the 9/11 events.
The fbUowing four research quesGons were invesGgated in this study:
1) Did the entire restaurant industry's systemaGc risk change signiGcantly after
the events o f 9/11? ;
2) Did the Gne/casual dining restaurant's systemaGc risk change signiGcanGy
aAer the 9/11 events? ;
3) Did the fanuly restaurant's systemaGc risk change signiGcantly aAer the 9/11
events? ; and.
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4) Did the fast-fbod restaurant's systematic risk change signiGcantly aAer the
9/11 events?

Research Hypotheses
In this secGon, imphcit hypotheses are described. The rejecGon of the null
hypothesis (H ,) would imply that there is a staGsGcally signiGcant difference in pre-9/11
and post 9/11 systemaGc risks, which may signal the underlying change of the restaurant
business characterisGcs. The test hypothesis is thus formulated and presented in Table 1.
Soon aAer the events o f 9/11, Technomic, Inc., a Chicago-based food service
consulting company, released new, reduced-growth estimates at the IntemaGonal
Foodservice Manufacturers AssociaGons' (IFM A ) annual Forecast and OuGook seminars,
reGecGng the impact o f the 9/11 events and the general economic slowdown in the U.S.
fbodservice industry ("Foodservice Growth Forecasts Reduced," 2001). Technomic
fbrecasted that consumers would continue to eat out, but would likely trade down in their
dining choices. As a result, limited-service restaurants such as fast-fbod restaurants
would face a slight boost, with 2002 sales growth projected to range Gom Gat to
approximately 3.5 percent. However, they projected that sales growth fbr the fuU-service
and upscale segment, such as Gne/casual dining restaurants, could be between -3 percent
and 3 percent. According to a U.S-based NPD Group Inc. report, a higher-than-average
number of Americans were choosing to order take-out fast fbod in the wake of the 9/11
attacks ("Fast Food Favoured," 2001). NPD also repoAed that full-service restaurant
sales, including upscale restaurants and mid-scale restaurants, dropped 1.2 percent each
year in the United States. Since the 9/11 events may have aGected each restaurant

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

segment differently, three snb-hypotheses were tested to see if the systemaGc nsk o f each
restaurant segment changed signiGcanGy due to the events of 9/11 :

Table 1
The Test Hypothesis and Three Sub-hvootheses fbr this Studv
Type o f Restaurant

Hypothesis
Ho: The post-9/11 beta o f the restaurant industry was not
signiGcantly different Gom its pre-9/11 beta.

Entire Restaurant
Industry

Hg: The post-9/11 beta o f the restaurant industry was
signiGcanGy different Gom its pre-9/11 beta.
Hoi : The post-9/11 beta o f the Gne/casual dining restaurant was
not signiGcanGy different Gom its pnor-9/11 beta.

Fine/casual dining
Restaurant

H ,! : The post-9/11 beta of the Gne/casual dining restaurant was
signiGcanGy different Gom its pnor-9/11 beta.
Ho2 : The post-9/11 beta o f the family restaurant was not
signiGcanGy different Gom its pnor-9/11 beta.

Family Restaurant

Ha2 : The post-9/11 beta of the family restaurant was signiGcanGy
diGerent Gom its prior-9/11 beta.
Ho]: The post-9/11 beta o f the fast-fbod restaurant was not
signiGcanGy different Gom its prior-9/11 beta.

Fast-fbod Restaurant
Ha3 : The post-9/11 beta o f the fast-fbod restaurant was
signiGcanGy different Gom its pnor-9/11 beta.
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LimitaGons o f the Study
This study has the fbllowing limitaGons:
1) The sample used in this study is limited to the restaurants whose com m on stocks
were publicly traded on the security market and whose financial data are available
on the Internet Website o f http://www.Gnance.yahoo.com; and,
2) Due to the small number of Gne dining restaurant Grms, they have to be combined
with casual dining restaurant Grms.
3) Numerous empirical studies have used the 60-month stock prices to estimate beta.
According to Femàndez (2002), historical betas depend on the data used (daily,
weekly, months, etc.), in almost all companies. This study only employs weekly
stock prices in the pre- and post-9/11 period over 52 weeks.

SigniGcance of the Study
First, this study conGrms whether the 9/11 events signiGcantly changed the
systemaGc risk o f restaurant Grms, thus providing some empirical evidence on the impact
o f market change on the change in the restaurant business characterisGcs. Second, this
study helps restaurant investors beGer assess the nature o f risk in the restaurant industry
in the post-9/11 time, thus assisting them in making informed investment decisions
according to their risk tolerance.
Third, the Gndings should provide useful infbrmaGon fnr restaurant execuGves
regarding their Gnancing decisions in the post-9/11 era. According to Ramchand and
Sethapakdi (2000), stock price volaGlity is driven by systemaGc as well as unsystemaGc
nsk. Ramchand and Sethapakdi suggested that changes in risk were important not only

10
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fbr theoreGcal reasons but also fbr the cost o f co ital o f a Grm, because they affect the
required rate o f return on equity. The cost o f capital of the Grm is o f concern to restaurant
entrepreneurs. A beGer understanding o f the possibility that risk feature can be changed
in the restaurant industry in the wake o f the 9/11 events should help industry execuGves
ac^ust their Gnancing strategy, if needed, such as with debt leverage.

OrganizaGon o f the Study
Chapter 1 presents the study's objecGves, problem statement, research quesGons,
hypotheses, hmitaGons, signiGcance, and deGniGons o f terms. Chuter 2 reviews the
hterature on the basic CAPM model and the change in systemaGc nsk. Chapter 3 presents
a discussion o f restaurant categories, data coUecGon procedures, the time Game o f the
study, the characterisGc line and beta, the estimaGon of beta, the cumulaGve abnormal
return, and the staGsGcal methods used in this study. Chapter 4 repoAs the empirical
results and analyzes the results. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the study by summarizing
its Gndings, discussing its implicaGons, and providing recormnendaGons G)r future
research.

DeGniGon o f Important Terms
1. Restaurant industry. A group o f Grms that cover a broad range o f fbod service
operaGons. The term comes Gom the French word reamwrnnr, meaning
"restorers o f energy." Any public place that specializes in the sale o f prepared
fbod fbr consumpGon on or o ff premises can be described as a restaurant
(Powers, 1995).

11
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2. Fine/casual dining restaurant. Most full-service establishments are small,
independent operaGons, some seaGng fewer than 100 guests (Powers, 1995).
The average per-person check at the typical Gne dining restaurant is $25 or
more (Ebbin, 2000). Casual dining offers popular Gxxls in a setting that is
more appealing than most midscale restaurants and more of a value than Gne
dining (John & Wayne, 1994). The average sale per guest in a typical casual
dining restaurant ranges Gom $15 to 24.99 (Ebbin, 2000).
3. Family restaurant. Family restaurants usually oGer breakfast, lunch, and
dinner. The average check per-person in a typical family restaurant is less than
$15 (Ebbin, 2000).
4. Fast-fbod restaurant. Parsa and Kahn (1992, p. 19) deGne a fast-fbod restaurant
as a "Grm with a mission to provide quicker service and core technology
geared towards this mission and commonly more attracGve fbr the customers
that demand convenience, speed, and simplicity o f service at an affbrdable
price." According to the NRA's Restaurant Industry OperaGon RepoA 2000,
the average daily seat turnover o f fast fbod restaurants is the highest
among the restaurant categones (Ebbin, 2000).
5. SystemaGc nsk. The term fystemahc r ü t is to be interpreted as the porGon o f
the vaiiaGon (or total nsk) in return on a security or portfblio that can be
eliminated by diversiGcaGon (Levy and Samat, 1984). It is deGned as the nsk
that results Gom factors that aGect the stocks o f all companies. It is the paA o f
a security's total risk that cannot be eliminated through an investor's
diversiGcaGon.

12
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6. Unsystematic risk. It is deGned as the nsk that results Gom factors that are
unique to a parGcular Grm. It is the part o f a security's total risk that can be
eliminated by an investor's diversiGcaGon.
7. Beta. The term W a is deGned as a measure o f the systemaGc risk o f a Grm's
common stock. It measures the sensiGvity o f the Gnancial asset's return to the
change in return on the overall market portfblio.
8. CharacterisGc line. A regression Gne that shows a Gnear relaGonship between
the rate o f return o f a security or portfbGo and the corresponding rates of
return o f the overall market portfbGo. The slope o f this Gne is used as the
estimated beta G)r the security or portfbGo.
9. Capital Asset Pricing Model fCAPM). The term CqpGn/ /fsset fncm g AfbdeZ
(CAPM) is deGned as the model that proposes that any stock's requGed rate o f
return is equal to the risk-Gee rate o f return plus a risk premium, where nsk
reGects diversiGcaGon (Bngham, 1992).
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW
IntmducGon
In order to provide a better understanding o f how a change in systemaGc nsk may
result Gom major market events, such as the 9/11 events, this chapter reviews previous
studies examining the fundamental determinants o f systemaGc risk and the factors that
may cause changes in systemaGc risk.

Basic C o ita l Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
One of the pillars in the theory o f Gnance is the CAPM that grew out o f the
seminal work by Markowitz on the mean-vaiiance hypothesis (Markowitz, 1952). CAPM
was later formally developed by Sharpe (1963; 1964) and Lintner (1965). According to
Lintner (1965) and Sharpe (1963; 1964), the CAPM theory describes a relaGonship
between the expected return on a security and its systemaGc risk measured by the beta
coefBcient. In CAPM, the equilibrium return on an asset f is symbolized as foGows:
e {r ; ) = r , + P , ( e {r ,

] - r, )

(2.1)

where:
R, is the return to holders o f equity securiGes o f Grm i;
R , is the risk Gee rate o f interest available to all individuals and Grms;
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is the expected rate o f return on the market poAfblio; and,
is deGned as the systemaGc nsk o f security i.
The basic CAPM equaGon above can also be expressed as:
J = a, +

A

Also,

), where

“ d a, = « ,( l- A ) -

) = Ry 4-ACov(R, ,R ,), where

....

The CAPM theory (Lintner, 1965; Sharpe, 1963,1964) proposes that the expected
return on a nsky asset is composed o f the nsk-Goe rate plus the risk premium, where the
nsk premium is the excess market return over the risk-Gee rate mulGplied by the level o f
systemaGc nsk G>r the speciGc investment. The beta is denoted by the symbol

and is

deGned as an index o f systemaGc risk. In CAPM, beta is the only security-speciGc
parameter that affects the expected return on a security because o f two diversiGed
portG)lio assumpGons. The model suggests that if markets are in equihbnum, the
expected rate o f return on a security is the sum o f the risk-Gee rate and the nsk premium,
where the nsk prenGum is the product o f the market pnce of nsk and a security's
systemaGc nsk (Haugen, 1995).
According to Haugen (1995), the CAPM model assumes that two types o f events
have impact on the volaGlity in a stock's rate o f return. The Grst type o f event is called a
/Mrcroevent, which affects an individual Grm. Microevents do not inGuence other Grms.
In other words, they have no effect on the value o f the market portfblio or its rate o f
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return. However, they do aSect the rate o f return on the individual stock. The
developments o f new products, the changes in accounting techniques in a particular hrm,
employee strikes, or the resignation or death o f a key person in a firm are examples of
microevents.
Other types o f events are macroevents. Unlike microevents, macroevents have an
impact on all firms' stock prices and the rates of return on individual securities. An
unexpected change in the rate o f inflation, an unexpected change in the Federal Reserve
discount rate, a change in the term structure o f interest rates, or the 9/11 events is
examples o f macroevents.

The Change in Systematic Risk
Another area o f studies involving CAPM investigates forces that cause a Grm's
beta, or an industry's beta to change. OfBcer (1973) examined changes in the variability
o f the market factor o f the NYSE and concluded that the changes in macroeconomic
indicators have some efkct on beta. Turnbull (1977) offered a theoretical model,
implying that the systematic risk o f a 6rm can be determined by the changes in the Arm's
speciGc components and economic variables. Robichek and Cohn (1974) indicated that
beta coefGcients are generally affected by macroeconomic variables.
Hamada (1972) adopted CAPM to depict the relationship among operating
leverage, jSnancial leverage, the variance o f sales or earnings, and the market beta.
Hamada demonstrated that the systematic risk o f the levered Arm consists o f two parts: a
Anancial leverage component and an operating risk component. Rubenstein (1973)
extended Hamada's work, and was the Arst researcher to demonstrate that the systemaAc
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risk o f the levered Arm could be written as a AmcAon of operating nsk. Rubenstein, while
holding pnce and variable cost constant and allowing quanAty sold to be stochasAc,
stated that the levered Arm's beta

) is a AmcAon of operating nsk, the variance of

sales per dollar o f assets, and a term that reAected the inAuence o f economy-wide events.
ThereA)re, Rubenstein was the Arst researcher to exphciAy demonsAate the fact that
exogenous economic events play a part in explaining systemaAc nsk, using the foAowing
expression:

-rjp C & J .ira r

Q. ''

£1 = 1

-------

Where the terms are as follows:
«g = the proporAon of the Arm's total assets devoted to acAvity a;
6^^= the total equity value o f the unlevered Arm;
T = the corporate tax rate;
= the number o f product lines the Arm supports;
= pnce per unit o f output in acAvity a;
= vanable cost per unit o f output in acAvity a;
f], = Axed costs in acAvity a;
= the contribuAon margin, which Rubenstein suggested reAects the operating
nsk;
p(gg

reAects the inAuence o f economy-wide events on acAvity a; and.
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Far ^

^

the uncertainty o f sales of per doUar o f assets devoted to a.

Lev and Kunitzky (1974) recognized that there might exist industry-wide,
exogenous, and uncertain variables that affect all firms in the marketplace. They
examined the negative relationship between earnings voladhty and stock price. Their
research showed that if jGrm management had the intuiAon to anAcipate the arrival o f
these random economic shocks, management could install internal smoothing
mechanisms designed to either reduce or eliminate the negaAve impact of these shocks on
the Arm's income, thus minimizing or eliminating the variance o f the Arm's earnings.
Cornne (1982) extended the Rubenstein (1973) work by developing a theoreAcal
relaAonship between systemaAc risk and business nsk. Conine demonstrated that not only
is the Arm's quanAty o f output a random variable, subject to macroeconomic factors
exogenous to the Arm, but also that both pnce and vanable costs may be random
vanables, subject to those same exogenous macroeconomic forces. Conine demonstrated
that the systemaAc nsk o f the unlevered Arm is a AmcAon o f price, vanable costs,
quanAty sales, market return, the uncertainty o f both quanAty sales, the contribuAon
margin, and the inAuence of economy-wide events on an acAvity. Therefore, Conine
demonstrated the reacAon of the overaA marketplace to an exogenous economic
perturbaAon.
More recenAy, GrifAn (2001) examined the degree o f economic leverage (DEL)
as an explicit determinant of systemaAc risk and assessed the incremental explanatory
power of the DEL through empirical testing. The DEL is deAned as the percentage
change in the Arm's sales that results Aom a unit percentage change attributable to an
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exogenous economic disturbance. GrifAn also indicated an economic disturbance as any
unforeseen event that possesses the power to disturb the equilibrium of the model and
equilibrium o f Arm operaAons. The exogenous economic disturbance used here is the
tragic events that had a disastrous impact on Arm sales. Because the Arm's returns are
generated by Arm sales, and the variance in sales is attributed to AuctuaAons in the
economy resulting Aom uncertainAes in the economic, poAAcal, social, and compeAtive
environment, an exogenous economic disturbance may be the explanaAon o f the change
in systemaAc nsk.

Literature Review Summary
The objecAve o f this literature review is to represent a histoncal roadmap o f the
relevant Anancial research o f the efkrts expended trying to beAer explain the change in
systemaAc nsk depending on an external environment. In this thesis, systemaAc risk is
considered as the variable beta contained within the CAPM, expression (2.1). This
chuter reviews histoncal studies examining the fundamental determinants o f systemaAc
risk and factors that may cause changes in systemaAc risk.
Sharpe (1963,1964) and Linter (1965) developed the CAPM theory, which
descnbes a relaAonship between the expected return on a secunty and its systemaAc nsk
measured by the beta coefGcient. In other words, in CAPM the expected return on a
security could be expressed as a AmcAon o f the nsk-Aee rate, the difference between the
market return and the nsk-Aee rate, and a systemaAc nsk factor caAed beta.
Haugen (1995) explained that the CAPM model assumed that two types o f events
affected the volaAlity in a stock's rate o f return: microevents and macroevents.
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Microevents have no effect on the value of the market portfolio or its rate o f return.
However, unlike microevents, macroevents have an impact on all firms' stock prices and
the rates o f return on individual securiAes.
Another aspect o f CAPM studies involved the change in systemaAc nsk. Hamada
(1972) was the first researcher to decompose the systemaAc nsk o f the levered company
in order to express beta as a fimcAon o f operating nsk and Anancial nsk. Building on
Hamada's work, Rubenstein (1973) was the Arst researcher to explicitly demonsAate the
fact that exogenous economic events play a part in explaining systemaAc risk. Rubenstein
stated that the levered Arm's beta is a funcAon o f operating nsk, the variance o f sales per
doUar o f assets, and economy-wide events.
Lev and Kunitzky (1974) perceived that industry-wide, exogenous, and uncertain
variables that affect all Arms in the marketplace might exist. Lev and Kunitzky
demonstrated the negaAve relaAonship between earnings volatility and stock pnce.
Furthermore, Lev and Kunitzky proposed that a Arm could either reduce or eliminate the
affects of these shocks by using internal smoothing mechanisms, if the Arm had an ability
to foresee the economic shocks.
Conine (1982) expanded Rubenstein's (1973) work by developing a theoreAcal
relaAonship between systemaAc risk and business risk. Conine demonstrated the reacAon
o f the overall marketplace to an exogenous economic disturbance.
GrifAn (2001) examined the DEL as an explicit determinant o f systemaAc nsk
and assessed the incremental explanatory power o f the DEL through empirical testing.
GrifAn also indicated an economic disturbance as any un&reseen event that possesses the
power to disturb the equilibnum o f the model and equihbnum o f Arm operaAons. GrifGn

20
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

recognized that the exogenous economic disturbance might be the explanaAon o f the
change in systemaAc nsk.
In order to provide a beAer understanding o f how a change in systemaAc nsk may
result Aom major market events such as the 9/11 events, this chuter reviews previous
studies examining the fundamental determinants o f systemaAc nsk and factors that may
cause changes in systemaAc nsk.
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CHAPTERS

DATA AND METHODOLOGY
InAoducAon
This chapter speciAes the data and the research methodology used to accompAsh
the objecAves of this study. First, a restaurant classiAcaAon is presented in which three
different types of restaurants are categorized. Second, the data collecAon procedure is
explained. Third, the Ame Aame employed A)r the study is discussed. Fourth, the
characterisAc line (CL) and beta are descnbed. Fifth, the procedure used to estimate beta
or systemaAc nsk o f a Arm's common stock is explained. Sixth, CumulaAve Abnormal
Return (CAR), which was employed to detect the pattern o f restaurant stock returns aAer
the 9/11 events, is discussed. Finally, the hypotheses regarding beta changes are tested.

Restaurant ClassiAcaAon/Categones
According to the NaAonal Restaurant AssociaAon (NRA), the restaurant industry
is deAned as an industry including aü meals and snacks prepared outside the home. The
deAniAon of the restaurant industry also includes aU takeout meals and beverages. The
NRA classiAes all eating establishments into three categones. The major restaurant
grouping used by the NRA in its analysis o f the industry is as fallows (Lundberg, 1994):
1. Commercial Restaurant Services (Group 1): This group consists of
establishments that are open to the public, are operated for proAt, and may

22
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

operate facîAAes and/or supply meal service regularly for others. Commercial
restaurant service accounts for 91 percent o f industry sales.
2. Noncommercial Restaurant Services (Group 2): This group comprises the
business, educaAonal, insAtuAonal, and governmental and noncommercial
organizations that operate their own restaurant services. As compared to
commercial food service, institutional fbodservice does not aim to make money;
it simply strives to provide a service. Although some establishments operate at a
proAt, this is not the aim o f the restaurant-service acAvity. Rather, they serve food
principally for their own employees, students, paAents, and so on.
3. M ilitary Restaurant Services (Group 3): M ilitary fbodservice is the smallest
segment. This group compnses the sales o f food and beverages at ofAcers' and
enlisted personnel clubs and m ilitary bases.
The commercial restaurant segment includes the Ane dining restaurant, casual
dining restaurant, family restaurant, and fast-fbod restaurant segments as deAned by
average check and other charactensAcs. The NRA (2000) descnbed a full-service
restaurant as an establishment that provides servers, and patrons pay aAer they eat. In
contrast, at a fast-fbod restaurant there is usually no table service, and patrons generally
order at a cash resister or dnve-tbru window, or they select items Aom a fbod bar and pay
befbre they eat.
Fine and Casual Dining Restaurants
Fine dining restaurants concentrate on providing services of high standards and
establishing a reputaAon that draws customers back Ame and Ame again. Most Ane dining
establishments are smaU, independent operaAons, some seating fewer than 100 guests
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(Powers, 1995). The chef and staff are highly trained and are weU known for giving
personalized service. According to Ware and Rndinick (1991), this type of restaurant
requires lower employee turnover because o f the high guest-check average. According to
the NRA Restaurant Industry Operation Report 2000, the average per-person check at the
typical Ane dining restaurant is $25 or more (Ebbin, 2000).
Casual dining restaurants provide a varied menu and table service, with prices
ranging Aom mid to upscale. Most casual restaurants have a unifying theme that pervades
the design o f the menu, interior décor, and oAen the exterior of the building (Powers,
1995). The ambience is intended to support a dining experience that is fun and relaxing.
In order to achieve this theme, casual dining restaurants may use an ethnic theme in both
décor and fbod service, depicting an event or adventure in a faraway place. In the
midscale price range, chains predominate with operaAons such as TG I Fnday's, Chili's,
Applebee's, Bennigan's, Red Lobster, and Olive Garden (Kochak, 2000; Powers, 1995).
According to the NRA Restaurant Industry OperaAon Report 2000, the sales per guest in
a typical casual dining restaurant average Aom $15 to $24.99 (Ebbin, 2000).
Familv Restaurants
Family restaurants, such as Denny's, Shoney's, and Big Boy, are table service
restaurants but compete principally with fast-fbod operaAons and have more in common
with these lower pnced operaAon than with upscale units (Powers, 1995). Family
restaurants usuaAy offer breakfast, lunch, and dinner. Most meals consist o f a choice o f
soup or salad, an enAée with roAs and buAer, and perhaps a dessert. This reducAon in
courses simpliAes service compared to Ane/casual dining restaurants. Platters,
sandwiches, and salads are the mainstay o f the menu, all attracAvely but simply served.
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Many fam ily restaurants oBer budget menus or special selections for seniors. To appeal
to all these market segments, family restaurants are offering expanded menus featuring
selecAons that are lighter and healthier (Powers, 1995). According to the NRA's
Restaurant Industry OperaAon Report 2000, the average check per person in a typical
farruly restaurant is less than $15 (Ebbin, 2000).
Fast-Food Restaurants
Fast-fbod restaurants are those that seA quickly prepared fbods. This kind of
restaurant is oAen a Aanchise operaAon. The limited menu is generally low pnced; the
fbod is mainly take-out in disposable containers. The stafGng requirements are minimal,
and staffs need not be highly trained (Ware & Rudnick, 1991). The key to the success o f
fast fbod is its simpAcity; fbr instance, its lim ited menu. Each item on the menu has been
engineered to simpAfy and standardize its purchase, producAon, and service.
SimpAAcaAon o f the producAon process permits the use o f unskiAed labor (Powers,
1995). AutomaAon is also cnAcal to the modem fast-fbod restaurant. The automating
concept means a reducAon in menu choices, sharp AmitaAons on customer service, and
different customer behavior. Through self-service, the customer replaces the entire Aontof-the-house staff) even to the point o f cleaning up. Moreover, because fast-fbod
operaAons offer a simple menu, very specialized and h i^ y efAcient kitchens can be built
around this Amited menu (Powers, 1995). According to the NRA's Restaurant Industry
OperaAon Report 2000, the average daily seat turnover o f fast-fbod restaurants is the
highest among the restaurant categories (Ebbin, 2000).
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Data CollecAon
This study attempted to identity beta diBerences, if any, o f restaurant Arms in the
pre-and post-9/11 penods. The restaurant stock data used in this study were taken Aom
Histoncal Stock Quotes at http://www.Anance.yahoo.com. The sample Air each type o f
restaurant in this study compnsed all public restaurant companies whose shares were
traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AM EX),
or NaAonal AssociaAon o f SecuriAes Dealers Automated QuotaAons (NASDAQ) during
the 52 weeks pnor to and the 52 weeks aAer the 9/11 events. The weekly stock returns Air
each restaurant, deAned as the percentage changes o f Arms' stock pnces ar^usted Air
dividends and stock splits, and the weekly stock return on market portAilio, were
coUected Air estimating the beta o f the categorized restaurant industry segment. The
weekly return on market portAiAo was represented by the changes in the Standard &
Poor's (S&P) 500 index, because the S&P 500 index is one o f the best indicators of
overall market direcAon. Many previous studies have used S&P 500 index to represent
overall market behavior. Restaurant Arms that did not have 52-week data beAire 9/11 or
aAer 9/11 were not included in the sample Air this study. Seventy-three restaurant
companies with complete stock price data between the period o f 52 weeks beAire 9/11
and 52 weeks aAer 9/11 were selected as the iniAal sample Air the study. Six companies
that were traded in the over-the-counter bulletin board were removed Aom the total
sample Air this study. Thus, a total o f Sixty-seven Arms were included in the Anal
sample. Twenty-three companies were in the fast-Aiod restaurant industry, sixteen Arms
were in the family restaurant industry, and twenty-eight were gathered Aom the
Ane/casual dining restaurant industry. The sample o f Arms is listed in Table 2.
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Table 2
Samnle Firms Selected fbr This Study
Type o f Restaurant

Casual/Fine dining
Restaurants
(28)

Company

Stock Symbol

1. Applebee's, In t'l, Inc.

APPB

2. Cheesecake Factory, Inc.

CAKE

3. Benihana, Inc.

BNHN

4. Brioker IntemaAonal, Inc.

EAT

5. BUCA, Inc.

BUCA

6 Champions Sports, Inc.

CMPP

7. Chicago Pizza & Brewery

CHGO

8. Darden Restaurants, Inc.

DRI

9. Dave & Buster's, Inc.

DAB

10. Granite City Food & Brewery, Ltd.

GCFBU

11. G rill Concepts, Inc.

GRIL

12. Landry's Seafbod Restaurants, Inc.

LN Y

13. Lone Star Steakhouse Saloon

STAR

14. Main St. & Main, Inc.

M A IN

15. Mexican Restaurants

CASA

16. O'Charley's, Inc.

CHUX

17. Outback Steakhouse

OSI

18. RARE Hospitality

RARE

19. Rubio's Restaurants, Inc.

RUBO

20. Ruby Tuesday's, Inc.

RI

21. Sizzler IntemaAonal

sz

22. Star BuBet, Inc.

STRZ

23. Total Entertainment

TENT

24. Tumbleweed, Inc.

TWED

25. Flannigan's Enterprises Inc

BDL

26. P.F. Changs's China Bistro, Inc.

PFCB

27. J.Alexanders's Corp

JAX

28. Atk Restaurant

ARKR

27
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 2 (Continued)
Samnle Firms Selected fbr This Study
Type o f Restaurant

Family Restaurants
(15)

Fast-Food Restaurants
(23)

Company

Stock Symbol

29. mOP Corp.

mp

30. Steak and Shake Co.

SNS

31. Ryan's Family Steak Houses

RYAN

32. Bob Evans Farms, Inc.

BOBE

33. Cahfbmia Beach Restaurants, Inc.

CPKI

34. CBRL Group, Inc.

CBRL

35. CEC Entertainment, Inc.

CEC

36. Eateries, Inc.

EATS

37. Elmer's Restaurants, Inc.

ELMS

38. Famous Dave's of America

DAVE

39. Fresh Choice, Inc.

SALD

40. Garden Fresh Restaurants

LTUS

41. Luby's Cafeterias

LUB

42. Max & Erma's Restaurants, Inc.

MAKE

43. Piccadilly Cafeteria, Inc.

PIC

44. Friendly Ice Corporation

FRN

45. Jack in the Box

JBX

46. McDonalds

MCD

47. Wendy's

W EN

48. Schlotzsky's, Inc

BUNZ

49. CKE Restaurants

CKR

50. Checkers Drive-In Restaurants, Inc

CHKR

51. Yum! Brands, Inc

YUM

52. Autogrill SpA

AGL

53. Back Yard Burger, Inc

BYBI

54. Diedrich CoBee Co.

DDRX

55. Frisch's Restaurants

FRS

56. Good Times Restaurants, Inc.

GTIM
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Table 2 (Continued)
Samnle Firms Selected fbr This Study
Type o f Restaurant

Fast-Food Restaurants
(23)

Company

Stock Symbol

57. Knspy Kreme

KKD

58. MerAage Hospitality Group Inc

MHG

59. Morgans, Food

MR

60. Nathan's Famous, Inc.

NATH

61. Panera Bread Co.

PNRA

62. P ^ a John's IntemaAonal, Inc.

PZZA

63. Pizza Am, Inc.

PZZI

64. Quahty Dining, Inc.

QDIN

65. Sonic Corp.

SONC

66. Starbucks CorporaAon

SBUX

67. Tnarc Companies, Inc.

TRY

JVb/e. Number in parenthesis indicates number of Arms in this segment included in the sample fbr
this study.

Time Frame o f the Study
In order to test the change in systemaAc nsk after the events o f 9/11, the time
Aame of this study was divided into two diBerent penods: the 52 weeks befbre the 9/11
events and the 52 weeks aAer the 9/11 events. This short period was chosen because a
longer post-9/11 penod would include addiAonal post-9/11 events, such as the war in Iraq
and the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic. Those events may also
have had an impact on the restaurant stock pnce and beta, thus making the impact o f 9/11
events on restaurant beta hard to determine.
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Characteristic Line (CL) and Beta
The relationship between the rate of return on a security i (denoted by R, ) and the
rate of return on a market portfolio (denoted by

) is explained by the characteristic line

(Brigham, 1992; Haugen, 1995; Moses & Cheney, 1989; Radclifle, 1994; Van Home,
1989). The characteristic line describes the return that the stock can be expected to
produce, as compared to the market's rate o f return. It is also described by the line ofbest
At that minimizes the sum of the squared verAcal distances Aom the line fbr each o f the
ordered pairs o f the return on a firm's security and the return on a market portAilio
(Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, 1989; Haugen, 1995; Moses & Cheney, 1989).
The charactensAc line can be described by its slope and the point at which it
passes through the verAcal axis (its y-intercept). The slope of the charactensAc line is
commonly referred to as the stock's beta and is denoted by the symbol )3. The slope or
beta indicates the degree to which the stock responds to changes in the return produced
by the overall market.
A value-weighted market portfblio, such as the Standard & Poors (S&P) 500
index, the NYSE index, or the NASDAQ composite index, is commonly used as the
market portfblio index (RadcliBe, 1994; Reilly, 1994). These market portfbhos contain a
representaAve sample o f all stocks, with each industry weighted in accordance with the
overall market.
Researchers (Haugen, 1995; Levy & Samat, 1984; Van Home, 1989) have
explained the concept o f a charactensAc line by suggesting the possibility o f classifying
Arms by their nsks. For example, if stocks have a beta greater than one (j3> 1), they are
classiAed as aggressive (risky) stocks, because they go up faster than the market in a bull
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market (rising market) but fall faster in a bear market (falling market). However, if stocks
have a beta less than one ()3 < 1), they are classiAed as defensive (low-risky) stocks,
because their returns Auctuate less than the market as a whole. Finally, if stocks have a
beta equal to one, they are classiAed as the neutral (as risky as the market) stocks,
because they Auctuate along with the market. According to Levy and Samat (1984), the
pnce o f "an ideal stock or portfblio" goes up faster than the market portfbho in a bull
market and goes down more slowly than the market portfblio in a bear market. Levy and
Samat (1984) also recommended the portfbho o f an ideal stock, which combines the
desirable properties ofboth a defensive, and an aggressive stock.

EstimaAon o f Beta
The fbllowing simple regression equaAon is fbrmulated using weekly restaurant
stock retum and weekly equal-weighted retum on market portfbho, represented by
weekly S&P 500 index change, to estimate the beta of each restaurant, where beta is a
measure o f the systemaAc nsk o f a Arm's stock:
+

(3.1)

Where:
R, = weekly restaurant stock retum;
R ,= weekly market portfbho retum;
a = constant;
= estimated beta; and,
g = the error about the regression hne.
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Based on this regression eqnaAon, the beta fbr each restaurant industry segment
was estimated. The slope of the characterisAc line is commonly referred to as the stock's
beta and is denoted by the symbol

The slope or the estimated beta indicates the degree

to which the stock responds to changes in the retum produced by the overall market.

Abnormal Retum (AR) and CumulaAve Abnormal Retum (CAR)
The CAR method was introduced by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969). In the
CAR method, the analysis penod is divided into an esAmaAon penod (a pre-event penod)
and a post-event penod. DesignaAon o f the locaAon and length o f either penod is
arbitrary. This study examined 104 weeks around the 9/11 events. This study designated
-52, -51, -5 0 ,..., -3, -2, -1 as the 52 weeks pnor to the 9/11 events, 0 as the 9/11 event
week, and +1, +2, + 3 ,..., 4-50, +51, +52 as the 52 weeks after the 9/11 events. Then, fbr
each o f the Arms in the sample, the rate o f retum on each of the 104 weeks is computed.
The pre-event penod observaAons were used to estimate the market model
parameters, such as

and

in expression (3.2), fbr the pre-event and the post-event

penod. AAer estimating the market model parameters, AR was calculated fbr each o f the
104 weeks fbr each Arm in the sample. AR ( g, ) Air a Arm on week t is presented as
fbllowing:
- ((^1 +

(3.2)

Where:
g, = abnormal retum on week t;
= the actual stock retum on week t;
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((Z, +

, ) = the expected stock retum on week t;

^= the market retum on week t;
O] = estimated market model constant Aom the pre-event period
observaAons; and,
= estimated market model beta Aom the pre-event penod
observaAons.
Expression (3.2) depicts that AR ( f , ) is considered as the market model
predicAon error during the analysis penod. An implicit assumpAon is that the market
model parameters ( a, and A )

not aBected by the Aical event during the post-event

penod. ThereAire, the market model predicAon error (AR), which is signiGcantly
diBerent Aom zero during the post-event period, is attributed to the event To measure the
eBects of the 9/11 events on sample securiAes, the average abnormal retum on week t is
obtained by averaging across the Arms in the sample and is summed to yield a CAR,
which stands Air the cumulaAve abnormal retum attained by each Arm on each o f the
Ame intervals previously selected. The /-test is used to identic whether the estimated
CAR of the post-9/11 period are signiAcantly diBerent Aom zero. The CAR 5 represents
the CAR Air week +5 in the post-9/11 penod. The CAR 52 is the CAR Air the 52™^week
in the post-9/11 penod. CAR (-52, -i) stands Air the CARs obtained during the pre-event
penod; CAR (-52, -20) is the sum o f the weekly average abnormal returns Air weeks -52 to
-20 during the pre-event penod; CAR (+i. +30) is the sum o f the weekly average abnormal
returns Air weeks 1 to 30 during the post-event period, and Anally CAR (+i, +52) stands Air
those obtained Air the post-event penod. Since the market model is estimated by
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employing the pre-event period observations, CAR (-5 2 , -i), which means the total sum o f
the market model predicAon errors in the pre-event penod, is zero.
In this study, in order to see if the beta charactensAc o f the restaurant industry
was changed after the 9/11 events, the analysis o f the CAR pattern is concentrated on the
post-9/11 penod. For example, if the CAR o f the post-9/11 period consistently nses or
drops, then the CAR pattern o f the post-9/11 penod may be an indicaAon that the beta has
changed due to the 9/11 events.
The posiAve abnormal retum is interpreted as resulting Aom a favorable event,
which increases the proAtability o f the affected secunAes. It is possible that the posiAve
abnormal retum is affected by the increase in the nsk factor when the market index rises
(bull market), and vice versa. I f the market index keeps nsing, and the systemaAc pattem
of a security' CAR drops gradually or becomes negaAve fbr the post-event penod, it is
possible that the market nsk (beta) is decreased (Lee, 1996). On the other hand, when the
market index keeps declining, the decrease in the market risk or beta can be a factor fbr
the posiAve CAR fbr the post-event penod. Therefbre, the systemaAc pattem of a
security's CAR can show the change in systemaAc nsk. In order to invesAgate the change
in beta, the CAR o f entire restaurant industry and each restaurant segment is used fbr this
study.

The Paired Sample TTest and Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test fbr Testing the Hypotheses
The primary goal o f this study was to invesAgate the change in systemaAc nsk in
the restaurant industry aAer 9/11. The Paired Samples / test was employed to determine
whether the post-9/11 beta o f the restaurant industry was signiAcantly different Aom its
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pre-9/11 beta. I f the estimated post-9/11 beta of the restaurant industry was statisAcally
significant Aom the estimated pre-9/11 beta of the restaurant industry, it would be
interpreted as evidence o f the impact o f the 9/11 events on the restaurant industry's
systemaAc nsk. If the estimated post-9/11 beta o f the restaurant industry was not
staAsAcally signiAcant Aom the estimated pre-9/11 beta of the restaurant industry, it
would be regarded as evidence o f nonexistence o f the impact o f the 9/11 events on the
restaurant industry's systemaAc nsk. The paired sample / test was also used to idenAfy
whether the post-9/11 beta o f the Ane/casual dining, family, and fast-fbod restaurants was
sigruAcanAy different Aom its pre-9/11 counterpart. Because o f the probabihty o f the
normormal distnbuAon o f the estimated betas o f sample restaurants, the Wilcoxon Signed
Ranks Test, a nonparametric subsAtute fbr the parametric r test, was also conducted to
examine the change in systemaAc nsk over the pre- and post-9/11 penods, not only in the
entire restaurant industry, but also in each categonzed restaurant segment.
The staAsAcal computer program, StaAsAcal Package fbr the Social Sciences
(SPSS 11.5), was used fbr data analysis. The paired samples / test and the Wilcoxon
Signed Ranks Test were conducted at the .05 level to test the null hypotheses (Ho, Hoi,
Ho2 , and H 0 3 ). The usual signiAcance level o f .05 was employed far this study. If the
observed value o f the test staAsAc feU in the rejecAon region, the null hypothesis was
rejected, or the altemaAve hypothesis was accepted. For example, if the observed z-value
fell in the z > 1.96, the null hypothesis was rejected at the .05 level.
In summary, data collecAon and research methodology used to test research
hypotheses o f this study were speciAed. Three different types o f restaurants were
segmented. The time Aame o f this study was divided into two different periods, which
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represent the 52 weeks prior to the 9/11 events and the 52 weeks alter the 9/11 events.
Furthermore, the procedure used to estimate beta or systemaAc nsk o f a Arm's share and
how CAR was used were explained. Next, Chapter 4 wiU discuss the results o f the testing
that was descnbed in this chuter.
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CHAPTER 4

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
IntroducAon
In Chapter 3, the methodology and procedure Ibr data analysis were presented. In
this chuter, the empirical results fbr this study are discussed and its Endings are
presented. First, an analysis of CAR is presented. The CAR patterns o f each restaurant
segment and the entire restaurant industry are discussed during the post-event penod. The
StaAsAcal / test results o f the CAR are also presented fbr the explanaAon of the analysis of
the CAR pattem. Second, the overview o f the change in systemaAc nsk of each restaurant
Arm is addressed. Third, the results o f staAsAcal testing o f the restaurant beta befbre and
aAer the 9/11 events are presented. Finally, the study Andings are analyzed and discussed.

Analysis o f CumulaAve Abnormal Retum (CAR)
Figure 2 shows the trend o f the S&P 500 index in the pre- and post-9/11 period.
The S&P 500 index fell markedly during the Ame Aame o f this study. Thus, over the
post-911 penod, there had been net movement downward in the S&P 500 index, which
means that the average stock market had a negaAve rate o f retum. Thus, an economic
recession might account fbr detenoraAon in the S&P 500 index in the pre- and post-9/11
penod.

37
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1500

1400-

1300-

c

12004

900-

800

-20

0

20

40

60

Event time from -5 2 weeks to 5 2 weeks
Wok. Event time of 20 stands fbr CAR (1,20). Event time of 0 stands fbr the 9/11 events week.
Figure 2 The S&P 500 Index Befbre and After the 9/11 Events

Figure 3 reports the CAR movement o f the fast-fbod restaurant segment in the
pre- and post-9/11 period. The CAR rose gradually from the 1st week to the 39th week in
the post-911 period. The positively increasing CAR of the fast-fbod restaurant segment in
the post-9/11 period means that its actual rate o f retum (
rate o f retum (a, +
model parameters (

) is higher than its expected

,) in equation (3.2). An imphcit assumption is that the market
and ^ ) were not afkcted by the 9/11 events in the post-9/11

period. Thus, the actual rate o f retum ( R^, ) o f the fast-fbod restaurant segment was
relatively higher than the market rate o f retum ( R , ^) in the post-911 period. Because the
market was in decline, with S&P 500 index, showing a negative rate o f return, the actual
rate o f retum (R ,,) o f the fast-fbod restaurant segment was relatively higher than the
market rate of return ( R , ^).Thus, this segment's beta might be decreasing fnm the 1st
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week to the 39th week in the post-9/11 period. However, the CAR dropped from the 39th
week until the last week in the post-9/11 period. This might indicate that systematic risk
was gradually increasing 6om the 39th week to the 52nd week in the post-9/11 period.
The inconsistent patterns o f CAR, which drifted upward and downward after the 9/11
events, may imply an overall insignificant change in its systematic risk fbr the 52 weeks
after the 9/11 events.
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Figure 3 Cumulative Abnormal Retum fbr the Fast-Food Restaurants

Figure 4 shows the CAR o f the family restaurant segment during the time hame
of this study period. The CAR o f the family restaurant segment in the post-9/11 period
shows a shghtly different pattem hom that o f the fast-fbod segment. As soon as the 9/11
events occurred, the CAR repeatedly moved downward and iqiward fbr a while. After the
9/11 events, the CAR declined fbr a couple o f weeks, rose fbr 4 weeks, and then dropped
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fbr a couple o f weeks again. The CAR started to rise continuously 6om the 9th week to
the 32nd week, except fbr the 6 weeks j&om the 20th week to the 26th week, then
declined fbr a couple o f weeks and rose again in the 39th week in the post-event period.
After the 39di week in the post-9/11 period, the CAR gradually decreased until the end of
the time frame o f this study. It is possible that the systematic risk o f the family restaurant
segment was unchanged during 10 weeks after the 9/11 events, gradually declined to the
32nd week, except fbr the 6 weeks 6om the 20th week to the 26th week, but then rose
after the 39th week in the post-9/11 period. Thus, in Figure 4, the CAR pattem o f the
family restaurant segment does not show consistent movement in either direction in the
post-911 period. Because o f that, its average beta fbr the 52 weeks might not have
changed signiAcantly after the 9/11 events.
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Figure 4 Cumulative Abnormal Retum fbr the Family Restaurants
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Based on the CAR patterns in Figures 3 and 4, the systematic risk o f the fast-fbod
and fam ily restaurant segments, which declined but then rose in the post-9/11 period as a
whole, might not have been fundamentally changed for the entire 52 weeks due to the
9/11 events. Therefore, these inconsistent movements of the CAR in the fast-fbod and
family restaurant segments may imply that the 9/11 events did not have enough driving
fbrce to change the beta characteristics of these two restaurant segments. Overall, the
fast-fbod and family restaurant segments seem to have experienced a clear "boost" after
the 9/11 events, probably because their businesses are mainly related to customers'
spending fbr 'necessity' aiming, whereby might reflect their unchanged beta
characteristics after the 9/11 events.
Interestingly, compared to that o f the fast-fbod and family restaurant segments,
the CAR o f the fine/casual dining segment shows a diSerent pattern. In Figure 5, the
CAR o f the hne/casual dining segment dropped steeply as soon as the 9/11 events
occurred, as if the CAR reflected the direct impact o f the 9/11. However, after the 7th
week in the post-9/11 period, the CAR rose sharply until the 39th week and then started
to drop continuously until the end o f the time 6ame o f this study. Thus, the systematic
risk o f the ûne/casual dining restaurant segment experienced an increase, a decrease, and
then an increase again in the post-911 period. Figure 5 indicates that there is no net
movement either up or down in the CAR pattern o f the fine/casual dining segment in the
post-911 period. This may also indicate that the 9/11 events did not have enough power
to change the original beta characteristic o f the Gne/casual dining restaurant segment.
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Figure 5 Cumulative Abnormal Return fbr the Fine/Casual Dining Restaurants

Figure 6 reports the CAR o f the entire industry as a whole. The CAR pattern o f
the entire restaurant industry in the post-911 period is quite similar to that of the
Sne/casual dining restaurant segment. In Figure 6, after the 9/11 events, the CAR o f the
entire restaurant industry dropped fbr a while. Because the CAR dropped in the
Gne/casual dining segment immediately after the 9/11 events, the CAR of the entire
restaurant industry had a negative value &om the 1st week to the 12th week in the post911 period. However, the CAR o f the restaurant industry gradually rose horn the 13th
week to the 39th week. After the 39th week, the CAR consistently plummeted again until
the last week o f the time frame o f this study. According to Figure 6, it is possible that the
systematic risk o f the entire restaurant industry temporally rose fbr a while as soon as the
9/11 events occurred, then gradually declined 6om the 12th week to the 39th week, and
rose again 6om the 39th week until the end o f the time frame o f this study. That may be
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an indication that even though the 9/11 events might have affected the entire restaurant
industry temporarily, they did not have an impact on the fundamental change in the beta
characteristic of the entire restaurant industry in the post-9/11 period.
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Figure 6 Cumulative Abnormal Return fbr the Entire Restaurant Industry

In order to measure the effects of the 9/11 events on restaurant firms' securities,
Table 3 reports the results of t tests used to identic whether the estimated CAR of the
post-9/11 period is signihcantly difkrent 6om zero. The weeks +5, +10, +15, +20, +25,
+30, +35, +40, +45, and +52 were chosen to see whether the estimated CARs are
significantly dif&rent hom zero on each selected week and to identify whether the
statistical results are consistent with the CAR pattern of each restaurant segment and far
the entire restaurant industry.
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In the fast-fbod restaurant segment, the CAR was signihcantly different hrom zero
in the weeks +15, +20, +25, +30, +35, +40, and +45 (CAR 15: t = 1.748,p = 0.094; CAR
20: f = 2.409,p = 0.025; CAR 25: t = 2.410,p = 0.025; CAR 30: t = 3.298,p = 0.003;
CAR 35: f = 2.904,p = 0.008; CAR 40: t =3.000,p = 0.007; CAR 45: t = 1.849,p =
0.078). The CAR fbr these weeks, which is signihcantly different 6om zero, might be
evidence o f the effects of the 9/11 events. The CAR being signihcantly different hom
zero in the +15, +20, +25, +30, +35, +40, and +45 weeks might reflect the CAR's upward
drift in the fast-fbod restaurant segment after the 9/11 events, as shown in Figure 3.
However, the CAR was not signiGcantly different hom zero in the weeks +5, +10, and
+52 (CAR 5 :f = 0.718,p = 0.480; CAR 10: f = 0.750,p = 0.461; CAR 52:

1.055,p =

0.303). The insignificant fast-fbod CAR of 52 in Table 3 might reflect the fast-fbod
CAR's persistent drop after the 39th week in the post-9/11 period in Figure 3. It is
interesting that the CAR is significantly different 6om zero in the weeks +15, +20, +25,
+30, +35, +40, and +45, but is not in the week +52 in the post-9/11 period. In Figure 3,
the CAR did not continuously drift either upward or downward but moved up and down
in the post-911 period. I f the CAR had moved up consistently until the end of the time
hame of this study in the post-911 period, then the fast-fbod CAR o f 52 in Table 3 would
have been significantly different horn zero. Thus, these statistical results of the fast-fbod
segment in Table 3 are consistent with the CAR pattern of the fast-fbod restaurant
segment in Figure 3, which does not show continuous net movement either up or down.
This consistency between the statistical results and the CAR patterns may indicate that
the s)%tematic risk of the fast-fbod restaurant segment was not signihcantly changed after
the 9/11 events.
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The CAR of the family restaurant segment was signiGcantly different Grom zero in
the weeks +30 and+35 (CAR 30:

1.752,p = 0.100; CAR 35: t = 1.873,p = 0.081).

The signiGcant family restaurant CAR of 30 and family restaurant CAR of 35 in Table 3
might mirror the CAR's move-up in the family restaurant segment aAer the 9/11 events in
Figure 4. However, the CAR fbr this segment was not signiGcantly different Grom zero in
the weeks +5, +10, +15, +20, +25, +40, +45, and +52 (CAR 5: i = 0.317,p = 0.756; CAR
10:r = -0.130,p = 0.899; CAR 15 : i = 0.773, p = 0.451 ; CAR 20: i = 1.320, p = 0.207;
CAR 25: r = 0.962, p = 0.351; CAR 40: i=1.530,p = 0.147; CAR 45: i = 0.737,p =
0.472; CAR 52: r = 0.269, p = 0.792). The non-signiGcant family restaurant CARs of the
weeks 5,10,15, and 20 in Table 3 might reGect the CAR's moves up-and-down fbr a
while right after the 9/11 events in Figure 4. The insigniGcant family restaurant CARs of
40,45, and 52 might reGect the family restaurant CAR's drop after the 39th week in the
post-911 period in Figure 4. In Figure 4, the CAR in the fannly restaurant segment
repeatedly driAed downward and upward until the 9th week aAer the 9/11 events. Then it
gradually rose until the 39th week but, aAer that, it plummeted unGl the last week o f the
time frame of this study. The statisGcal results are also consistent with the CAR pattern of
the family restaurant segment in Figure 4, which driAed upward and downward. Thus, the
staGsGcal results of the farmly restaurant segment might represent that its average
systemaGc nsk was not signiGcanGy changed due to the 9/11 events.
In the Gne/casual dining restaurant segment, the CAR was signiGcanGy different
Aom zero in the weeks +5, +10, +30, +35, and +40 (CAR 5: f = -4.374,p = 0.000; CAR
10: i = -1.705,p = 0.100; CAR 30: t = 2.462,p = 0.021; CAR 35: t = 2.421,p = 0.022;
CAR 40: r =2.463, p = 0.020). The signiGcant CAR in the weeks +5 and +10 in Table 3
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might reGect the CAR's plummet right aAer the 9/11 events in the Gne/casual dining
restaurant segment, but weeks +30, +35, and +40 mirror the CAR's gradual ascent.
However, the CAR was not signiGcantly diGèrent Aom zero in weeks +15, +20, +25,
+45, and +52 (CAR 15: i = 0.046,p = 0.963; CAR 20: i = 1.404, p = 0.172; CAR 25: i =
1.037,p = 0.309; CAR 45: t = 0.734,p = 0.469; CAR 52: f = 0.094,p = 0.926). The nonsigniGcant Gne/casual dining CARs of 15,20, and 25 in Table 3 might reGect the
recovery Aom the drop of the Gne/casual dining restaurant segment right after the 9/11
events in Figure 5. The CAR's continuous plummet after the 39th week might have
caused the non-signiGcant Gne/casual dining CARs of 45 and 52. In the Gne/casual
dining restaurant segment, statisGcal results in Table 3 are consistent with the CAR
patterns in the post-9/11 period in Figure 5. Thus, these staGsGcal results might also
indicate that the average systemaGc risk of the Gne/casual dining restaurant segment was
not signiGcanGy changed after the 9/11 events.
In the entAe restaurant industry, the CAR was signiGcantly different Aom zero in
the weeks +5, +20, +25, +30, +35, +40, and +45 (CAR 5: r = -1.667,p = 0.100; CAR 20:
i = 3.040,p = 0.003; CAR 25: f = 2.574,p = 0.012; CAR 30: i = 4.405,p = 0.000; CAR
35: i = 4.247,p = 0.000; CAR 40: t = 4.147,p = 0.000; CAR 45: i = 1.968,p = 0.053).
The signiGcant CAR in week +5 might reGect the CAR's r^ id plummet aAer the 9/11
events, but in weeks +20, +25,+30, +35,+40, and +45 it might mirror the CAR's
continuous ascent in the entire restaurant industry aAer the 9/11 events. However, the
CAR of the entire restaurant industry was not signiGcanGy different Aom zero in weeks
+10, +15, and+52 (CAR 10: i = -0.989,p = 0.326; CAR 15:

1.350,p = 0.182; CAR

52: i = 0.872, p = 0.386). The non-signiGcant CAR in week +52 might reGect the CAR's
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continuoiis drop aAer the 39th week. In the entire restaurant industry, the staGsGcal
results of this study suppoA the explanaGon Air the CAR paAems because they are
consistent with the CAR paAem of the entire restaurant industry in the post-9/11 period.
In summary, the staGsGcal i tests results in Table 3 are generally consistent with the CAR
paAems o f each restaurant segment and of the enthe restaurant industry in the post-9/11
penod. According to the staGsGcal results in Table 3, the change in average systemaGc
nsk may not be signiGcant Air each restaurant segment, or Air the entire restaurant
industry in pre-and post-911 period.

Table 3
T Test for CAR diGerence bv week
Type

rvalue

#

f (2-tail Sig.)

Fast-Food CAR 5

0.718

22

0.480

Family Rest CAR 5

0.317

15

0.756

Fine/Casual Dining CAR 5

-4.374

27

0.000***

Entire Restaurant CAR 5

-1.667

66

0.100*

Fast-Food CAR 10

0.750

22

0.461

Family Rest CAR 10

-0.130

15

0.899

Fine/Casual Dining CAR 10

-1.705

27

0.100*

EnGre Restaurant CAR 10

-0.989

66

0.326

Fast-Food CAR 15

1.748

22

0.094*

Family Rest CAR 15

0.773

15

0.451

Fine/Casual Dining CAR 15

0.046

27

0.963

Entire Restaurant CAR 15

1.350

66

0.182

Fast-Food CAR 20

2.409

22

0.025**

Family Rest CAR 20

1.320

15

0.207

Fine/Casual Dining CAR 20

1.404

27

0.172

Entire Restaurant CAR 20

3.040

66

0.003***
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Table 3 (Continued)
TTest for the CAR difference bv week
Type

rvalue

4T

Fast-Food CAR 25

2.410

22

0.025**

Family Rest CAR 25

0.962

15

0.351

Fine/Casual Dming CAR 25

1.037

27

0.309

Entire Restaurant CAR 25

2.574

66

0.012**

Fast-Food CAR 30

3.298

22

0.003**

Family Rest CAR 30

1.752

15

0.100*

Fine/Casual Dining CAR 30

2.462

27

0.021**

Entire Restaurant CAR 30

4.405

66

0.000***

Fast-Food CAR 35

2.904

22

0.008***

Family Rest CAR 35

1.873

15

0.081*

Fine/Casual Dining CAR 35

2.421

27

0.022**

Entire Restaurant CAR 35

4.247

66

0.000***

Fast-Food CAR 40

3.000

22

0.007***

Family Rest CAR 40

1.530

15

0.147

Fine/Casual Dining CAR 40

2.463

27

0.020**

Entire Restaurant CAR 40

4.147

66

0.000***

Fast-Food CAR 45

1.849

22

0.078*

Family Rest CAR 45

0.737

15

0.472

Fine/Casual Dining CAR 45

0.734

27

0.469

Entire Restaurant CAR 45

1.968

66

0.053*

Fast-Food CAR 52

1.055

22

0.303

Family Rest CAR 52

0.269

15

0.792

Fine/Casual Dining CAR 52

0.094

27

0.926

Entire Restaurant CAR 52

0.872

66

0.386

f (2-tail Sig.)

Abre. The data is based on the 2-year period 2000-2002. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05,
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< 0.01.

Overview, of the Changes in Systematic Risk
Table 4 provides descripGve staGsGcs of both the pre- and post-9/11 beta fbr the
entire restaurant industry and each of three restaurant segments. The objecGve of
providing the descripGve staGsGcs of each restaurant segment's beta and the entire
restaurant industry's beta during the analysis penod is to proGle and summarize the
overall change in systemaGc nsk after the 9/11 events. In Table 4, the sample shows that
the mean beta declined after the 9/11 events in the entire restaurant industry 6om 0.56 to
0.51. The decline of mean beta in the fast-fbod restaurant segment was largest, horn 0.67
to 0.47. The mean beta o f the family restaurant segment also declined from 0.51 to 0.39.
However, (he mean beta of the Gne/casual dining restaurant segment increased shghGy
Gom 0.50 to 0.62 after the 9/11 events. This result might be reGected by both substanGal
negaGve declines of CAR fbr a Gme n ^ t aAer the 9/11 events and (he continuous decline
of the CAR after the 39th week in the Gne/casual dining restaurant segment in the post9/1 1 penod.

Table 4
DescnnGve StaGsGcs of Beta fbr the Restaurant Industrv and Three Restaurant
Segments in the Pre-9/11 and (he Post-9/11 Penod

Type

Mean
Stanckrd
Minimum
Maximum
DeviaGon
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Pre- PostPre- Post- PrePostPre- Post9/11
9/11
9/11
9/11 9/11
9/11
9/11
9/11

Restaurant industry

0.56

0.51

0.52

0.45

-0.45

-0.54

2.08

2.18

Fast-fbod

0.67

0.47

0.62

0.39

-0.45

-0.54

2.08

1.16

Family

0.51

0.39

0.41

0.37

-0.36

-0.23

1.21

1.04

Fine/Casual dining

0.50

0.62

0.48

0.50

-0.26

-0.16

1.88

2.18

Ab/g. The data is based on the 2-year penod 2000-2002.
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In Table 5, each restaurant Arm's beta during the pre- and post-9/11 period is
estimated over the 52 weeks of each period by the single index model in equahon (3.1).
As Table 5 shows, restaurant stocks are generally regarded as low-risk (defensive) stocks
because most restaurant betas over the 2-year period 2000-2002 were much lower than
one. In Table 5, the betas of pre-9/11 in the entire restaurant industry are slightly higher
than those of the post-9/11. The betas of 30 Arms out of the total sample increased aAer
the 9/11 events. However, the betas of the 37 companies out of the total sample decreased
in the post-9/11 period. In the Ane/casual dining restaurant segment, the betas of 13 Arms
decreased, and 15 Arms' betas increased aAer the 9/11 events. The betas of 11 Arms out
of the family restaurant segment decreased, and only A)ur companies' betas increased
after the 9/11 events. In the fast-fbod restaurant segment, 13 Arms' betas dropped and 10
increased aAer the 9/11 events. Both in the pre- and post-9/11 period, eight Arms out of
the total sample (the pre-9/11 period: BNHN, CHGO, CHUX, TENT, ARKR, LTUS,
BUNZ, PZZI, and fbe post-9/11 period: GRIL, STRZ, EATS, ELMS, GTIM, NATH,
PZZL QDIN) had a negaAve beta, which usually indicates that when the market return
increases, the return of an individual stock decreases, and vice versa (FemAndez, 2002).

Table 5
Restaurant Firms' Beta Values fbr the Pre-9/11 and the Post-9/11 Period
Type of Restaurant

Symbol

Pre-9/11 beta

Post-9/11 beta

Fine/Casual Dining

1. APPB

0.381

0.367

Restaurants

2. CAKE

1.032

0.724

3.BNHN

-0.164"

0.115

0.803

0.496

(28)

4. EAT
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Table 5 (Continued)
Restaurant Firm's Beta Values fbr the Pre-9/11 and the Post-9/11 Period
Type o f Restaurant

Fine/Casual Dining
Restaurants
(28)

Symbol

Pre-9/11 beta

Post-9/11 beta

5. BUCK

0.830

2.178

6.CMPP

0.005

0.478

7. CHGO

-0.258"

0.805

8.D R I

0.461

0.429

9. DAB

0.711

0.236

10. GCFBU

0.795

0.148

11. GRIL

1.877

-0.100^

12.LNY

0.812

0.927

13. STAR

0.665

0.982

14. M A IN

0.100

0.577

15. CASA

0.809

0.703

16. CHUX

-0.150"

0.334

17. OSI

0.437

0.709

18. RARE

0.292

0.922

19.RUB0

0.583

0.689

20. RI

0.296

0.729

21. SZ

0.337

1.077

22. STRZ

0.541

-0.155*

23. TENT

-0.056"

1.738

24.TW ED

0.881

0.222

25. BDL

0.151

0.102

26. PFCB

1.255

0.790

27. JAX

0.596

0.523

-0.112"

0.708

29IHP

0.705

0.374

30. SNS

0.332

0.556

31. RYAN

0.416

0.932

28. ARKR
Family Restaurants
(15)
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Table 5 (Continued)
Restaurant Firm's Beta Values fbr the Pre-9/11 and the Post-9/11 Period
Type o f Restaurant

Family Restaurants
(15)

Fast-fbod Restaurants
(23)

Symbol

Pre-9/11 beta

Post-9/11 beta

32. BOBE

0.166

0.729

33. CPKI

1.085

1.035

34. CBRL

0.908

0.215

35. CEC

0.447

0.130

36. EATS

0.152

-0.152*

37. ELMS

0.109

-0.234*

38. DAVE

1.206

0.157

39. SALD

0.711

0.151

40. LTUS

-0.363"

0.010

41.LUB

0.606

0.836

42.M AXE

0.168

0.046

43. PIC

0.738

0.693

44. FRN

0.699

0.500

45. JBX

0.821

0.320

46.M CD

0.334

0.696

47. WEN

0.544

0.533

48. BUNZ

-0.446"

0.548

49.CKR

1.510

1.155

50.CHKR

0.793

0.941

51. YUM

0.946

0.476

52. AGL

0.158

0.675

53. BYBI

0.439

0.848

54. DDRX

2.080

0.650

55.FRS

0.052

0.403

56. GTIM

0.785

-0.544*

57.KKD

1.790

0.501

58.M HG

0.402

0.613

59. MR

0.738

0.064
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Table 5 (Continued)
Restaurant Finn's Beta Values fbr the Pre-9/11 and the Post-9/11 Period
Type o f Restaurant

Fast-fbod Restaurants
(23)

Symbol

Pre-9/11 beta

Post-9/11 beta

60. NATH

0.083

-0.035*

61.PNRA

1.173

0.780

62.PZZA

0.862

0.461

63. PZZI

-0.127"

-0.003*

64. QDIN

0.361

-0.073*

65. SONC

0.367

0.494

66. SBUX

1.435

0.994

67. TRY

0.360

0.364

Abfg. The data is based on the 2-year period 2000-2002. Number in parenthesis indicates the
number of firms in this segment included in the sample fbr this study. " represents a negative beta
in the pre-9/11 period. * represents a negative beta in the post-9/11 period.

Test Results
The results of the paired sample r test were used to idenhfy whether the estimated
pre-9/11 beta of the restaurant industry differed staGstically signiAcanGy Gom its
estimated post-9/11 beta. Table 6 shows the results of the paired sample r test of the
entire restaurant industry, the casual/Ane dining restaurant segment, the family restaurant
segment, and the fast-fbod restaurant segment. The research hypothesis (Ha) is not
siqrported because the r staGsGc (f = 0.605, p = 0.547) fbr the beta of the entire restaurant
industry was not staGsGcally signiGcant at the 0.05 level. Hg states that the post-9/11 beta
of the entire restaurant industry is signiGcanGy different Gom its pre-9/11 beta. This
result explicitly shows that the post-9/11 beta of the entire restaurant industry is not
staGsGcahy different Gom its pre-9/11 beta at the 0.05 level of signiAcance.
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Table 6
Paired Sample T Test fbr the Entire Restaurant Industrv and Three Restaurant Segments
Industry

/-value

4T

f (2-tail Sig.)

The entire restaurant industry

0.605

66

0.547

Fine/Casual dining restaurants

-0.918

27

0.367

Family restaurants

1.193

15

0.251

Fast-fbod restaurants

1.581

22

0.128

/Vbfe. The data is based on the 2-year period 2000-2002.

The research hypothesis (H*i) is also not supported, because the t statistic value (r
= -0.918,/) = 0.367) fbr the beta of the Ane/casual dining restaurant segment was not
staAsAcally signiAcant at the 0.05 level of signiAcance. Hai stated that the post-9/11 beta
of the Ane/casual dining restaurant segment is signiAcantly different Aom its pre-9/11
beta. This result clearly presents that the post-9/11 beta o f the Ane/casual dining
restaurant segment was not staAsAcally different Aom its pre-9/11 beta at the 0.05 level
of signiAcance.
The research hypothesis (H ,;) is rejected because the f staAsAc value (i =1.193, p
= 0.251) fbr the beta of the family restaurant segment was not staAstically signiAcant at
the 0.05 level. H , 2 stated that the post-9/11 beta o f the family restaurant segment is
significantly different Aom its pre-9/11 beta. This result explicidy indicates that the post9/1 1 beta of the family restaurant segment was considered the same value as its pre-9/11
beta at the 0.05 level.
The research hypothesis (Hgs) is also rejected, because the t staAsAc value (/ =
1.581,p = 0.128) fbr the beta of the fast-fbod restaurant segment was not staAsAcally
signiAcant at the 0.05 level. Hgs stated that the post-9/11 beta of the fast fbod restaurant
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segment is not signiAcanÜy different Aom its pre-9/11 beta. This result clearly shows that
the post-9/11 beta of the fast-fbod restaurant segment was not staAsAcally different Aom
its pre-9/11 beta at the 0.05 level.
The results of the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test fbr the entire restaurant industry
and three restaurant segments are shown in Table 7. The entire restaurant industry, with
33.11 negaAve ranks and 35.10 posiAve ranks, shows that the minimum sum of ranks is
1225 fbr the negaAve ranks and is 1053 fbr the posiAve ranks. The mean rank reported in
the test data table is computed by dividing the sum of ranks total by the number of
negaAve or posiAve ranks. Thep value (p = 0.591) fbr the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
of the entire restaurant industry imphes that the research hypothesis (Hg) is not supported
at the 0.05 level. Therefbre, the post-9/11 beta of the entire restaurant industry is not
sigmAcanAy different Aom its pre-9/11 beta. As a result, it clearly shows that there is no
signiAcant change in average beta fbr the entire restaurant industry after the 9/11 events.
In the Ane/casual dming restaurant segment, with 12.12 negaAve ranks and 16.57
posiAve ranks, the minimum sum of ranks is 157.50 A r the negaAve ranks and is 248.50
A r Ae posiAve ranks. Thep value (p = 0.300) A r Ae Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test of Ae
Ane/casual dining restaurant segment implies that Ae research hypoAesis (Hgi) is
rejected at Ae 0.05 level. ThereAre, Ae post-9/11 beta of Ae Ane/casual dining
restaurants is not signiAcantly different Aom its pre-9/11 beta. This result clearly shows
that Aere is no signiAcant change m average beta A r Ae Ane/casual dining restaurant
segment after Ae 9/11 events.
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Table?
The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test A r Ae Entire Restaurant Adustrv and Three Restaurant
Segments
The Entire Restaurants

N

Mean Rank

Sum ofRanks

W SAAsAc

f Value

NegaAve Ranks

37

33.11

1225

-0.537

0.591

PosiAve Ranks

30

35.10

1053

Ties

0

Total

67

Fme/Casual Dining

N

Mean Rank

Sum ofRanks

W SAAsAc

f Value

NegaAve Ranks

13

12.12

157.50

-1.036

0.300

PosiAve Ranks

15

16.57

248.50

Ties

0

Total

28

Family ResAurants

N

Mean Rank

Sum ofRanks

W StaAsAc

f Value

NegaAve Ranks

11

8.00

88

-1.034

0.301

PosiAve Ranks

5

9.60

48

Ties

0

Total

16

Fast-Food Restaurants

N

Mean Rank

Sum ofRanks

W StaAsAc

f Value

NegaAve Ranks

13

14.15

184

-1.399

0.162

PosiAve Ranks

10

9.20

92

Ties

0

Total

23

The data is based on Ae 2-year period 2000-2002. Negative ranks mean the post-9/11 beta
is less than the pre-9/11 beta. Positive ranks mean Ae post-9/11 beta is greater than Ae pre-9/11
beta. Ties mean Ae post-9/11 beta is equal to Ae pre-9/11 beta.

A Ae fiamily restaurant segment, w iA 8 negaAve ranks and 9.6 posiAve ranks, Ae
minimum sum of ranks is 88 A r Ae negaAve ranks and is 48 A r Ae posiAve ranks. The p
value (p = 0.301) A r Ae Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test o f Ae family restaurant segment
implies that Ae research hypoAesis (ILa) is not supported at Ae 0.05 level. ThereAre, Ae
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post-9/11 beA of Ae family resAurants is not signiGcantly Afferent Gom iA pre-9/11
beA As a result, Aere was no fundamental change m average beta of Ae family
restaurant segment aAer Ae 9/11 evenA.
A Ae fast-fbod resAurant segment, w iA 14.15 negaGve ranks and 9.20 posiGve
ranks, Ae minimum sum of ranks is 184 A r Ae negaGve ranks used A r Ae Wilcoxon
Signed Ranks Test. The p value (p = 0.162) A r Ae Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test implies
that Ae research hypoAesis (Hgs) is not supported at Ae 0.05 level. ThereAre, Ae post9/1 1 average beA o f Ae fast-fbod resAurant was not signiGcanGy AfArent Gom iA pre9/11 beta.
A summary, when it comes to comparing average betas, Ae paired sample / test
and Ae WGcoxon Signed Ranks Test show that one must accept Ae hypoAeses that Ae
pre- and post-9/11 betas are equal A r Ae entire restaurant mdustry and each restaurant
segment. ThereAre, Aese resulA can be considered as strong evidence that Aere was no
signiGcant impact of Ae 9/11 evenA on Ae systemaGc nsk of Ae entire restaurant
mdustry, nor on that of each restaurant segment.

Summary
A general, resAurant stocks are recognized as defensive (low-nsky) stocks
because Aeir Grms' average beA values over Ae 2-year period 2000-2002 are much less
than one. Due A an economic recession over Ae 2-year period, Ae S&P 500 mdex
conGnuously dropped durmg Ae Gme Game of Gns study. BoA Ae CAR pattern and Ae
resulA of Ae CAR's / tesA m Ae enAe restaurant mdustry and A each restaurant
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segment suggest Aat Ae 9/11 evenA Ad not have an impact on Ae fundamental change
m Ae beta characterisGc of Ae resAurant mdustry m Ae post-9/11 period.
The resulA of the paired sample / test show that Ae post-9/11 beta was not
staGsGcaUy Afferent Gom Ae pre-9/11 beA m Ae entire resAurant mdustry and each
categorized resAurant segment. Also, Ae resAts of Ae WGcoxon Signed Ranks Test are
consistent wiA Ae previous resulA of Ae paired sample / test.
This chuter has presented Ae Gndings and resulA of this sAdy. The next chuter
presenA a summary of this sAdy and Ascusses Ae implicaGons of Ae tesA of Ae
hypoAeses, and presenA an agenda A r Ature sAdy.
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CHAPTERS

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Summaiy
The primary purpose of this study was A investigate whether Ae systematic risk
of Ae restaurant mdustry was signiGcanGy changed aAer Ae evenA of 9/11. More
speciGcally, this sAdy's objecGve was to mvesGgaA Ae change m systemaGc nsk of
three types of restauranA, mcluding Ae Gne/casual dining, family, and fast-fiaod
resAurant segmenA, aAer Ae 9/11 evenA. The sAdy mvesGgated 67 restaurant
companies whose shares were traded on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ during Ae 52
weeks pnor and Ae 52 weeks aAer Ae 9/11 evenA. Twenty-three restauranA were
mcluded m Ae fast-fbod restaurant segment. The family restaurant segment consisted of
16 Grms. Twenty-eight compames were mcluded m Ae Gne/casual dining resAurant
segment. Thus, Ae Atal number of Grms mcluded m Ae study was 77.
According A Ae CAR patterns m Figures 4.2 through 4.5 and Ae staGsGcal
resulA of Ae CAR / test m Table 3, Ae change m systemaGc nsk may not be signiGcant,
eiAer m each restaurant segment or m Ae enAe restaurant industry. The restaurant
stocks' mean beA is 0.56 over Ae 52 weeks m Ae pre-9/11 period and is 0.51 m Ae post911 period. Based on Ae resulA of descripGve staGsGcs, all of Ae resAuranA experienced
a slight decrease m beA after Ae evenA of 9/11. The fast-fbod and family restaurant
segmenA also experienced declines m Aeir average beA values after Ae 9/11 evenA.
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However, Ae average beA value m Ae jEine/casual dining resAurant segment slighGy
mcreased aAer Ae 9/11 events. During Ae 2-year period 2000-2002, resAurant stocks
could be characterized as defiensive stocks (low risk) on Ae whole. This risk proAle is
probably characterized by less sensiGvity to Ae exogenous environment, such as Ae
economic growA rate, Ae inAaGon rate, recession, or acA of terronsm.
The resulA of Ae paired sample / test and Ae Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test show
that Ae post-9/11 beA was not staGsGcally AAerent Aom Ae pre-9/11 beA A r Ae entire
resAurant industry, or by each categorized restaurant segment. Because Ae entire
restaurant mdustry and each type of resAurant segment Ad not expenence a fundamental
change m beta, it is possible that Ae resulA reGected Ae stability of restaurant Arms'
betas due A qmckly rebounding and mcreased sales m Ae restaurant mdustry; Aus, a
structural shiA precipiAted by Ae 9/11 evenA evidenüy Ad not occur. According to Ae
NRA (2002), m Ae 6 months Allowing Ae 9/11 evenA, Ae restaurant mdustry continued
to recover Aom Ae impact of Aese evenA. AlAough Ae resAurant mdustry was affected
by Ae terronst attacks and an economic recession, iA sales had rebounded A pre-attack
levels by November 2001. A December 2001, resAurant-industry sales jumped above
pre-attack levels, posting a single-monA sales record of $ 28.4 bülion. A 2001,
restaurant-industry sales had an mcrease of 0.8 percent on an inGaGon-adjusted basis.
AAer Ae 9/11 events, resAurant-industry sales mcreased 1.3 percent m 2002 (NaGonal
Restaurant AssociaGon, 2003). Due to Ae resiliency of Ae restaurant mdustry, Ae
restaurant mdustry was able A minimize Ae eGecA of Ae 9/11 evenA. In oAer words,
Ae 9/11 evenA Ad not AmdamentaGy impact resAurant customers' psychological
behavior. Restaurant customers continued eaGng out aAer Ae 9/11 evenA. This powerAil
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Gnding demonstrates Aat Ae US resAurant mdustry is mdeed resAent, which has
potenGally important implicadon A r resAurant manager and mvestor. ThereAre, Ae
resilient resAurant mdustry was able to experience a recovery and mcreased sales aAer
9/11. Due to Ae mcreased sales m Ae resAurant mdustry, Ae beA might not have
changed aAer 9/11.

Conclusions
The conclusions of this study are as AGows:
1. Restaurant stocks are generally deAnsive (low risky) stocks m comparison to the
market;
2. The post-9/11 beA is not signiGcanGy AfArent Gom Ae pre-9/11 beA A r Ae
enAe resAurant mdustry and each segment of resAurant, such as Ae Gne/casual
dining resAurant, Ae famüy resAurant, and Ae fast-Gx»d resAurant;
3. The unchanged beA might reGect recovered sales and mcreased sales m Ae post9/1 1 period. ThereAre, Ae change m beA might not be signiGcant; and,
4. Even Aough Ae 9/11 evenA might have an impact on Ae restaurant mdustry
temporarily, Aey do not have enou^i driving Arce to change Ae beA
characterisGc A r Ae 52 weeks after Ae evenA of 9/11.

ImpGcaGons of Ae Study
The nsk feature unaGected by an exogenous environment m Ae restaurant
mdustry may have important impGcaGons A r mvesArs and execuGves of Ae hospitality
mdustry. This sAdy shows that Ae restaurant mdustry w ^ generaGy characterized by
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low risk during Ae period 2000-2002. FurAermore, Ae post-9/11 beA of Ae enAe
restaurant mdustry and each resAurant mdustry segment is not sAhsGcally Afferent Grom
Ae pre-9/11 beA. These resulA are probably due to Ae resihency of Ae resAurant
mdustry. Thus, Ae restaurant mdustry recovered its sales far more qmckly and at a much
faster pace Aan Ad oAer mdustries aAer Ae 9/11 terrorist attacks (Nolt & Foulkes,
2003).
According to Ae AeoreGcal Gramework of CAPM (LmAer, 1965; Sharpe, 1963,
1964), a Arm's systemaGc nsk is Ae risk related to Ae capital markets, raAer Aan to Ae
Grms itself. Therefbre, beta, which measures systemaGc nsk, inGuences Ae mvesArs'
required rate of return. The higher Ae beta, Ae higher Ae required rate of return and
hence Ae lower Ae stock value A r an existing shareholder. The lower Ae beta, Ae lower
Ae required rate o f return and hence Ae higher Ae stock value A r Ae existing
shareholder. Based on an improved understanding o f Ae unchanged nsk of Ae restaurant
mdustry m Ae wake of the 9/11 events, restaurant mvesArs and portAho managers w iA
restaurant shares can use restaurant stocks as buffers A offset high nsk stocks and A
create a more efBcient mvestment portAho.
Management is concerned w iA maximizing wealA; AereAre, it needs A consider
Ae relaGonship between decisions and risk. The cost of capital depends on nsk.
ThereAre, coital structure decisions are dependent on risk. Based on Ae knowledge of
Ae unchanged risk feature m Ae restaurant mdustry aGer Ae 9/11 events, restaurant
management can make more competent and aggressive capital decisions that can mcrease
systemaGc nsk, such as Ae adAGon of new services, expansion o f exisGng services, debt
Gnancial leverage. Its quick recovery G"om Ae 9/11 events implies low busmess nsk A r
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restaurant Grms. ThereAre, aggressive restaurant owners can afArd to take more
Gnancial risk by mcreasmg leverage. Because interest rates are currenGy at very low
levels, increasing a Grm's debt wül likely lower its overall cost of capital.

RecommendaGons A r Future Research
In order to invesGgate Ae impact of Ae exogenous environment such as Ae 9/11
events on Ae hospitahty mdustry, Ature sAAes can extend Ae time Game by collecting
monthly stock pnces instead of weekly stock prices. Numerous empincal sAAes have
used 60-monA stock prices to estimate beta. ThereAre, m order to generalize Ae resAts
of beA esGmaGon, beA can be estimated over 60 months m Ae pre- and post-9/11 period
A r Ature sAAes.
Finally, Ae study can be extended to oAer hospitality mdustry sectors such as
hotels, gammg Grms, and airhne companies. Because Aey have AfArent characterisGcs,
Ae impact of changes m Ae exogenous environment on Aem may AfAr. Thus, m order
to mvesGgate Ae impact of Ae 9/11 evenA on Ae hospitality mdustry as a whole, each
hospitality segment w ill need A be Ascussed m Ature sAAes.
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